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OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”), a law meant to guarantee that employees 
will receive the retirement benefits they are promised, 
governs pension plans.  We determine whether the calculation 
of retirement benefits that the United Refining Company and 
co-defendants (who appeal and are collectively referred to 
throughout this opinion as “United”) provided in a pension 
plan to a specific class of former employees (collectively, 
“Employees”) varied, as United argues, depending on how 
old they were when they elected to receive the benefits.  
Because United’s reading finds no support in the text of the 
plans, we affirm the rulings of the District Court. 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
John Cottillion worked at United for 29 years, from 
1960 until 1989.  He was 54 years old when he quit, and his 
benefits had vested under “the 1980 Plan,” which is the 
version of United’s Pension Plan for Salaried Employees that 
applies to people whose benefits vested (i.e., became non-
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forfeitable under ERISA) after 1980 but before 1987.  
Because his employment at United was long enough to vest 
benefits and he was too young on leaving United to receive 
those benefits, Cottillion belongs to the subset of former 
United employees involved in this lawsuit: “terminated vested 
participants” or “TVPs” in United’s pension plan.  TVPs are 
distinct from Early Retirees, who are not a part of this 
litigation; the latter are people who retired directly from 
United at an age older than 59½ or 60 (depending on the 
applicable Plan) but younger than 65. 
When Cotillion left the company, United wrote a letter 
informing him that “[a]s a terminated Pension Plan 
participant with a vested interest, you are eligible for a 
deferred retirement benefit from the United Refining 
Company Pension Plan for Salary [sic] Employees.”  The 
letter further stated that he “may elect to have [his] monthly 
retirement benefit begin at anytime [sic] after October, 1995,” 
the month in which Cottillion would turn 60, and that his 
“monthly retirement benefit will be $573.70 at age 60.”  The 
letter did not state that the amount of Cottillion’s benefit 
depended on whether he elected to receive it at age 60 or 
later.  TVPs under the 1987 Plan were likewise informed of 
their pension amounts and told they could receive them the 
month following their “59½ birthday . . . without any 
reduction for early retirement.”  E.g., Beverly Eldridge, 
Application for Commencement of Deferred Vested Benefits, 
Terminated Vested Participants (Jan. 9, 1997). 
On January 30, 2002, United amended and restated the 
plan, backdated to January 1, 1995 (the “1995 Plan”), to 
comply with then-recent amendments to ERISA.  The Internal 
Revenue Service informed United that certain changes needed 
to be made to the Plan before it could issue a letter 
confirming that the 1995 Plan would receive favorable tax 
treatment; in response, United amended the 1995 Plan, 
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effective January 1, 2002 (the “2002 Plan”).  Both the 1995 
and 2002 Plans included a § 5.04(c), absent from the 1980 
and 1987 Plans, stating that the benefits of TVPs who receive 
pensions before age 65 would be “actuarially reduced to 
reflect the earlier starting date thereof.”  Neither the 1995 
Plan nor the 2002 Plan applies to any employee-plaintiff in 
this case, but they are relevant because of what happened 
next. 
In 2005, plan actuaries (professionals who perform a 
variety of services relating to implementing and maintaining 
ERISA plans) at the firm Towers Perrin informed Lawrence 
A. Loughlin, the plan administrator, that United had 
erroneously paid to TVPs vested under the 1980 and 1987 
Plans pensions that were not “actuarially reduced,” i.e., 
calculated in light of the TVP’s age.  (The younger a 
beneficiary is, the longer she will receive benefits, and thus 
retirement plans often lower benefits for people who take 
them early so that the benefits are worth the same regardless 
when they begin to be paid.)  Because operational deviations 
from the terms of ERISA-governed plans can jeopardize their 
favorable tax treatment, John Owsen, United’s (now 
deceased) longtime outside counsel for benefits matters, sent 
a letter to the IRS in November 2005 proposing to recoup the 
excess funds paid.  Owsen’s letter followed the IRS’s 
voluntary correction program through which employers may 
notify the Service of proposals to fix mistakes in 
administering ERISA plans and receive assurance that the 
IRS will not disqualify a plan from favorable tax treatment.  
The letter cited and attached the 2002 version of § 5.04(c), 
but it did not call attention to the absence of this language in 
the 1980 and 1987 Plans.  In March 2006 the IRS issued a 
“Compliance Statement,” which affirmed that the IRS “will 
not pursue the sanction of Plan disqualification on account of 
the qualification failure described in the Submission,” but 
cautioned that it “does not express an opinion as to the 
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accuracy or acceptability of any . . . material submitted with 
the application” and “should not be construed as affecting the 
rights of any party under any other law, including” ERISA.  
In July and August 2005, after notification from 
Towers Perrin but before the IRS correspondence, United sent 
letters to TVPs who had not yet begun to receive benefits “to 
clarify when you can receive your pension from United 
Refining Company and under what terms.”  This letter stated 
that if a TVP elected to receive retirement benefits before 
turning 65, the benefit would be reduced to reflect the early 
election date in accord with the following table: 
Age Factor 
64 89% 
63 80% 
62 72% 
61 65% 
60 59% 
59 ½ 56% 
 
About a year later, United sent letters to TVPs who 
were already receiving pensions.  These letters stated, “The 
Plan document requires that all pension benefits paid to 
terminated vested participants PRIOR to their Normal 
Retirement Age of 65 years MUST be actuarially reduced to 
the earlier payment date” (emphasis in original).  Indeed, 
some retirees were told that in two weeks from the date of the 
letter their monthly pension would be lowered “until the 
excess payments have been recovered, after which you will 
begin receiving the amount that should have been provided to 
you based on the correct calculation.”  Others were told that 
in two weeks “your monthly pension benefit payment will 
stop and you will not receive any future payments.  
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Additionally, in order to recover excess payments, you should 
repay the Plan” the amount of money already paid that 
exceeded the actuarially reduced benefit.  In Cottillion’s case, 
his pension of $506.58 per month was eliminated, and he was 
told he should pay the Plan $14,475.  The letters represented 
that the reductions were necessary for the Plan to retain its 
favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code and 
that the statements in the letter were “based on the [IRS]’s 
published revenue procedures and Compliance Statement 
which the Plan Retirement Committee must follow.” 
After receiving this letter, the Employees represent 
that Cottillion had a telephone conversation with Loughlin, 
the plan administrator and author of the letter, during which 
Cottillion complained about the reduction in pension benefits.  
Loughlin told him that the reduction corrected a mistake that 
had resulted in excessive payments.  Several other aggrieved 
TVPs wrote to Loughlin, who replied by letter that the plan 
documents required the correction to maintain the plan’s 
favorable tax treatment.  Some, but not all, who complained 
were informed that they could file a written appeal of 
Loughlin’s decision. 
The Employees sued in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania alleging, as relevant here, that United’s actions 
deprived them of a benefit to which they were entitled under 
the Plan, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and that 
they violated ERISA’s “anti-cutback” rule, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1054(g), which prohibits employers from amending a plan 
in a way that reduces benefits accrued under a defined benefit 
plan (such as the Plans at issue here).  Judge Sean 
McLaughlin denied United’s Motion to Dismiss and later 
granted the Employees’ Motion for Summary Judgment in 
part and denied United’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
holding that United’s actions violated the anti-cutback rule.  
When Judge McLaughlin resigned to enter the business 
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world, the case was assigned to Judge Cathy Bissoon.  She 
granted the Employees’ Motion for Class Certification, 
granted in part their Motion for Final Remedy (enjoining 
United from actuarially reducing Employees’ benefits and 
awarding damages to make whole those who had been 
receiving too little, but declining to order United to pay 
anything to TVPs who had not yet elected to receive 
benefits), and granted United’s Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, dismissing with prejudice the Employees’ 
remaining counts because any relief would be duplicative.   
United appeals then-Judge McLaughlin’s summary 
judgment decision and Judge Bissoon’s order on remedies.  
The Employees cross-appeal the latter order and the award of 
judgment on the pleadings. 
II. The District Court Properly Excused the 
Employees from Exhausting Plan Remedies. 
United argues that it was entitled to summary 
judgment because the named plaintiffs failed to exhaust the 
remedies available to them under the Plan.  See, e.g., Harrow 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 
2002).  The Employees do not dispute that ordinarily the 
named plaintiff in an ERISA class action must exhaust plan 
remedies before bringing suit and that Cottillion and Beverly 
Eldridge did not, but they argue that: (1) they were not 
required to exhaust remedies because of the nature of their 
claim; (2) exhaustion is an affirmative defense and United has 
not met its burden of persuasion on the issue; and (3) there is 
undisputed record evidence that exhaustion would have been 
futile. 
While we review de novo the legal standard that a 
district court applies in determining whether an employee 
must exhaust plan remedies before coming to federal court, 
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the court’s ultimate decision whether to require a plaintiff to 
exhaust is committed to its sound discretion.  Harrow, 279 
F.3d at 248; see also D’Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 F.3d 287, 
290 (3d Cir. 2002); Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
269 F.3d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 2001); Stevens v. Employer-
Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension Fund, 979 F.2d 444, 
459 (6th Cir. 1992); Springer v. Wal–Mart, 908 F.2d 897, 899 
(11th Cir.1990); Janowski v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 
No. 710 Pension Fund, 673 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1982), 
judgment vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1222 (1983). 
The Employees argue that the exhaustion requirement 
does not apply to their anti-cutback claim based on 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1054(g), as there is “a distinction . . . between claims based 
on pension rights created by contract, which must be 
[exhausted if the plan provides for remedies], and claims 
based on purely statutory rights created by ERISA, which 
may be asserted in federal court directly.”  Delgrosso v. 
Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir. 1985).  We need not 
resolve whether in general the exhaustion requirement applies 
to an anti-cutback claim or whether this particular suit states 
“a simple contract claim artfully dressed in statutory 
clothing.”  Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 
826 (1st Cir. 1988).  As discussed below, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in holding that exhaustion would 
prove futile. 
The Employees misconstrue the futility exception to 
the exhaustion requirement when they argue that, because 
exhaustion is an affirmative defense, United bears the burden 
of proving that it would not be futile.  True, “[t]he exhaustion 
requirement is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense” for 
United.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 280 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Yet futility is an exception to the exhaustion 
requirement, and “[a] party invoking this exception must 
provide a clear and positive showing of futility before the 
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District Court.”  D’Amico, 297 F.3d at 293; accord Harrow, 
279 F.3d at 249.  Therefore, this argument against dismissal 
for failure to exhaust also fails. 
In any event, the District Court held that the 
Employees had shown exhaustion of their Plan remedies 
would have been futile.  As we wrote in Harrow: 
Whether to excuse exhaustion on futility 
grounds rests upon weighing several factors, 
including: (1) whether plaintiff diligently 
pursued administrative relief; (2) whether 
plaintiff acted reasonably in seeking immediate 
judicial review under the circumstances; (3) 
existence of a fixed policy denying benefits; (4) 
failure of the [defendant] to comply with its 
own internal administrative procedures; and (5) 
testimony of plan administrators that any 
administrative appeal was futile.  Of course, all 
factors may not weigh equally.   
 
279 F.3d at 250. 
The District Court excused the Employees from the 
exhaustion requirement because they showed that United had 
a fixed policy of denying benefits.  Cottillion v. United Ref. 
Co., No. 1:09-cv-140, 2013 WL 1419705, at *14–*15 (W.D. 
Pa. Apr. 8, 2013).  The Employees made this showing by 
supplying the District Court with extensive correspondence 
between Loughlin and aggrieved TVPs.  Loughlin sent form 
letters out to all TVPs apprising them of the reduction in their 
benefits.  When anyone wrote back to him to complain, 
Loughlin would reply that the change in benefits was 
mandated by the IRS.  Many of the letters failed to inform 
recipients of the possibility of an appeal.  There is no 
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evidence in the record that any TVP got anywhere by seeking 
further review from Loughlin, and that United continues to 
adhere to the position that TVPs are only entitled to 
actuarially reduced benefits further supports the inference that 
exhaustion was futile.  At least one TVP (Frederick Hane) 
followed the instructions in Loughlin’s letter and the 1987 
Plan’s appeals procedures.  But rather than demonstrate that 
the issues raised in Hane’s letter were considered an appeal of 
an earlier determination, Loughlin (on behalf of the 
retirement committee) treated Hane’s objections as 
“questions” and offered him no relief or opportunity for 
further review. 
The failure of Hane’s appeal, the existence of a fixed 
policy denying benefits as evidenced by the correspondence 
between Loughlin and the many TVPs with letters in the 
record, and the absence of any evidence before us to suggest 
that an appeal from Loughlin’s letter was anything other than 
time wasted, lead us to conclude that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in applying the futility exception to 
the exhaustion requirement.  Thus we continue. 
III. The Plans Unambiguously Afforded TVPs 
Retirement Benefits Without Actuarial Reduction. 
The 1980 and 1987 Plans gave the plan administrator 
discretion in interpreting their terms.  Thus, in evaluating the 
Employees’ benefits-due claim, we review Loughlin’s 
interpretation under a deferential standard and will uphold it 
unless it is arbitrary and capricious.  Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989); Fleisher v. Standard 
Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120–21 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2012).  
However, the parties dispute the standard of review for the 
Employees’ claim that Loughlin’s interpretation of the Plan 
adopted in his letters to TVPs (that the Plan provided only 
actuarially adjusted benefits, contrary to United’s earlier 
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representations) violated the anti-cutback rule.  The 
Employees urge that the District Court correctly deferred to 
Loughlin’s first interpretation of the Plans—that they 
provided benefits in the same dollar amount to TVPs who 
elected to receive them before age 65 as to those who began 
receiving them at age 65 or later—and correctly did not defer 
to the second one as the “reinterpretation” was really a sub 
rosa plan amendment to reduce accrued benefits in violation 
of the anti-cutback rule.   United argues that under Conkright 
v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010), Loughlin’s final 
interpretation—the one allowing reduction of benefits—is 
entitled to deference. 
We need not determine who has the better of this 
argument.  As we shall see, no amount of deference can 
rescue Loughlin’s second interpretation from its flat 
contradiction with the terms of the 1980 and 1987 Plans.  We 
therefore assume without deciding that the deferential 
arbitrary and capricious standard applies, under which a 
“court may overturn a decision of the Plan administrator only 
if it is without reason, unsupported by the evidence or 
erroneous as a matter of law.”  Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 113 F.3d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Abnathya v. Hoffmann–LaRoche, 
Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir.1993)), abrogated on other 
grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 
(2008).  Even under that standard, an administrator’s 
“interpretation may not controvert the plain language of the 
document.”  Dewitt v. Penn-Del Directory Corp., 106 F.3d 
514, 520 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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A. The Plans’ Texts Support the Employees’ 
Position. 
To determine whether Loughlin’s second interpretation 
contradicts the actual words of the 1980 and 1987 Plans, we 
quote the relevant provisions. 
Article VII of the 1980 Plan reads: 
7.01 Required Service for Vesting 
 
If a Participant’s employment shall terminate prior to 
his Normal Retirement Date [age 65, § 4.01] or an 
Early Retirement Date [age 60, § 4.02], for any reason 
other than death, he shall be entitled to a deferred 
vested Retirement Income if he is credited with at least 
ten . . . years of Vesting Service at the time of his 
employment termination. . . . 
 
7.02 Amount and Commencement of Deferred 
Vested Retirement Income 
 
The amount and time of commencement of a deferred 
vested Retirement Income to a Participant who 
satisfies the requirements of Section 7.01 shall be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 5.03, based on the Participant’s Benefit 
Service and Average Compensation at the time of 
employment termination. . . . 
 
Section 5.03 provides: 
 
A Participant who retires on an Early Retirement Date 
may elect to receive one of the following: 
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(a) His Accrued Retirement Income computed as of his 
Early Retirement Date commencing at the end of the 
month in which his Normal Retirement Date would 
have occurred. 
 
(b) A reduced amount of Retirement Income to begin 
at the end of the month in which his Early Retirement 
Date occurs, computed so as to be a percentage of the 
benefit provided for him under paragraph (a) of this 
Section 5.03, in accordance with the following table: 
 
Number of Years Prior to 
Normal Retirement Date 
(Interpolate if not a 
Whole Number) 
 
 
Percentage 
0 100.0% 
1 100.0% 
2 100.0% 
3 100.0% 
4 93.3% 
5 86.7% 
 
On October 27, 1988, United put in place 
“Amendment 5” to the 1980 Plan, effective July 1, 1987.  
Amendment 5, which applies to all class members covered by 
the 1980 Plan, in relevant part rewrites § 5.03 of the 1980 
Plan to read in its entirety: 
A Participant who retires on an Early Retirement Date 
will receive his Accrued Retirement Income computed 
as of his Early Retirement Date commencing at the end 
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of the month in which his Early Retirement Date 
occurs.   
 
“Accrued Retirement Income . . . as of any particular 
date” is defined under § 5.02 as an amount to be computed in 
accordance with § 5.01, which lays out the method of 
calculation for the “annual rate of Retirement Income.”  
Section 5.01 describes the method of calculation as (roughly 
speaking) a percentage of average compensation multiplied 
by time of service with United, with qualifications and 
complications not at issue in this appeal. 
To summarize, per § 7.02 a TVP gets retirement 
income in accordance with § 5.03, which states that a 
participant who retires is entitled to “Accrued Retirement 
Income,” which is calculated under § 5.01 with respect to a 
participant’s average compensation and length of service with 
the company. 
The 1987 Plan is quite similar as it concerns this 
appeal.  Article VII provides: 
7.01 Required Service for Vesting. 
 
If a Participant’s employment shall terminate prior to 
his Normal Retirement Date for any reason other than 
death, he shall be entitled to a deferred vested 
Retirement Income if he is credited with at least five 
. . . years of Vesting Service at the time of his 
employment termination. . . .  
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7.02 Amount and Commencement of Deferred 
Vested Retirement Income. 
 
The amount of a deferred vested Retirement Income to 
a Participant who satisfies the requirements of Section 
7.01 shall be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 5.03, based on the Participant’s 
Benefit Service and Average Compensation at the time 
of employment termination. . . .   
 
Section 5.03 provides: 
 
Early Retirement Annual Accrued Retirement Income. 
 
A Participant who retires on an Early Retirement Date 
will receive his Accrued Retirement Income computed 
as of his Early Retirement Date commencing at the end 
of the month in which his Early Retirement Date 
occurs.   
“Accrued Retirement Income” is the amount specified 
in § 5.02, which, as in the 1980 Plan, is the “amount 
computed in accordance with Section 5.01,” which in turn 
provides a formula roughly based on a percentage of average 
compensation multiplied by the employee’s tenure at United.   
The Early Retirement Date under the 1987 Plan 
initially occurred the month after an employee turned 60, but 
it was lowered effective February 1, 1996, to age 59½. 
A straightforward reading of the 1980 and 1987 Plans, 
consistent with United’s early interpretations of these Plans, 
leads to the conclusion that TVPs were entitled to pensions in 
an amount that did not include an actuarial adjustment for the 
number of years younger than 65 that they were when they 
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retired.  Under both plans, § 7.02 tells us that a TVP gets 
retirement income in accord with § 5.03, which states that a 
retiree is entitled to “Accrued Retirement Income,” which is 
calculated under § 5.01 with respect to a participant’s average 
compensation and length of service with the company.  Not 
one of these provisions treats TVPs differently from people 
who retire directly from United, and no provision requires 
actuarial adjustment (read reduction) for taking retirement 
benefits early.  Loughlin’s second interpretation conflicted 
with the plain meaning of the terms of the Plans and thus 
denied the Employees benefits due them in violation of 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), notwithstanding the Plans’ conferral on him 
of discretion to interpret Plan provisions.  Epright v. Envtl. 
Res. Mgmt., Inc. Health & Welfare Plan, 81 F.3d 335, 342–43 
(3d Cir. 1996) (“By imposing a requirement which is 
extrinsic to the Plan[s], [Defendants have] acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously.”). 
The second interpretation also violated the anti-
cutback rule, which occurs when an “accrued benefit” is 
eliminated or reduced by a “plan amendment.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1054(g)(1).  “There is no question but that a standard early 
retirement benefit, provided exclusively upon the satisfaction 
of certain age and/or service requirements, is an accrued 
benefit that is protected by” § 1054(g).1  Bellas v. CBS, Inc., 
                                              
1 The statute reads:  
(g) Decrease of accrued benefits through amendment 
of plan 
(1) The accrued benefit of a participant under a 
plan may not be decreased by an amendment of 
the plan, other than an amendment described in 
section 1082(d)(2) or 1441 of this title [neither 
of which applies in our case]. 
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221 F.3d 517, 524 (3d Cir. 2000).  Sections 7.01 and 7.02 of 
both Plans provide precisely the early retirement benefits 
described in Bellas and are thus “accrued benefits.”   
United argues, however, that the early retirement 
benefits are not “accrued benefits” because § 5.01 of both 
Plans provide calculations for “[t]he annual rate of 
Retirement Income payable to a Participant who retires on or 
after his Normal Retirement Date.” (emphasis added).  Thus, 
according to United, anyone who retires before his normal 
retirement date has no accrued retirement benefits.  What this 
argument ignores is the combined effect of §§ 7.01, 5.03, 
5.02, and 5.01.  Section 7.01 vests retirement income in 
TVPs; § 5.03 directs the administrator to calculate TVPs’ 
Accrued Retirement Income as of the date of early retirement, 
while § 5.02 states that the amount of Accrued Retirement 
Income is computed “in accordance with Section 5.01.”  In 
other words, §§ 5.01, 5.02, and 5.03 provide the method for 
computing TVPs’ benefits, while § 7.01 actually confers the 
benefits, making them “accrued” within the meaning of 
ERISA. 
Our Court’s “view of what constitutes an ‘amendment’ 
to a pension plan has been construed broadly to protect 
                                                                                                     
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a plan 
amendment which has the effect of— 
(A) eliminating or reducing an early 
retirement benefit or a retirement-type 
subsidy (as defined in regulations), or 
(B) eliminating an optional form of 
benefit, 
with respect to benefits attributable to service 
before the amendment shall be treated as 
reducing accrued benefits.  29 U.S.C. § 1054. 
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pension recipients.”  Battoni v. IBEW Local Union No. 102 
Employee Pension Plan, 594 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“An erroneous interpretation of a plan provision that results in 
the improper denial of benefits to a plan participant may be 
construed as an ‘amendment’ for the purposes of” § 1054(g).  
Hein v. F.D.I.C., 88 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1996).2   
The critical question in this case, in light of the 
absence of a formal plan amendment, is whether Loughlin’s 
“interpretation of the Plan improperly denied accrued benefits 
to” the Employees.  Id. at 216–17.  The answer is yes.  In 
1988, United’s understanding of the Plans accorded with the 
plain reading of the Plans that we have discussed above.  By 
2005, United had reinterpreted the Plans and decided that 
they required actuarial adjustments to the amounts paid to 
TVPs who took early retirement.  This incorrect interpretation 
resulted in the improper denial of TVPs’ accrued early 
retirement benefits and thus violated ERISA’s anti-cutback 
rule. 
                                              
2 Some Circuits have taken a narrower view of the meaning of 
“amendment” than Hein—see Richardson v. Pension Plan of 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 112 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Dooley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 797 F.2d 1447, 1451–53 (7th 
Cir. 1986)—but, as the Second Circuit has noted, a Treasury 
Regulation interpreting the provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code that implements 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) supports our 
Court’s view and is entitled to deference under Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  Kirkendall v. Halliburton, Inc., 707 F.3d 173, 183 
(2d Cir. 2013) (discussing Limitations on Availability of 
Benefits, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,050-01, 26,064 (July 11, 1988) 
(codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)–4)). 
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B. United’s Counterarguments Fail to Persuade. 
United makes several arguments to the contrary, none 
convincing.  Its arguments can be grouped into four 
categories: (1) internal textual arguments (the text of the 1980 
and 1987 Plans supports United); (2) external textual 
arguments (the text of documents other than the Plans 
supports United); (3) structural (the Plans address Early 
Retirees and TVPs in separate sections, and thus they treat 
differently these different kinds of participants); and (4) 
statutory (because ERISA sets a floor for benefits, we should 
interpret the Plans to provide only that floor absent a clear 
and express plan provision to the contrary).  We address each 
in turn. 
1. The Internal Textual Argument 
United’s argument from the Plans’ text is that § 5.03 
entitles only “[a] Participant who retires on an Early 
Retirement Date” to benefits (emphasis added).  They argue 
that “retire” means “retire from United,” because 
“‘Retirement Date’ expressly required ‘actual retirement’ 
from the Company with an immediate right to draw down a 
pension benefit.”  Opening Br. at 14.  (Recall that by 
definition all TVPs left United before they were old enough 
to retire from the company at age 59½ or 60.)  But no 
definition in any plan defines “retire” or “Retirement Date” 
with reference to separation from United.  Instead, both the 
1980 and 1987 Plans (at § 1.31) define “Retirement Date” as 
the date of “actual retirement,” but not actual retirement from 
United.   
For support, United cites pages 1645 ¶ 18 and 1684 
¶ 27 of the Joint Appendix.  Both citations lead to United’s 
statement of material facts in support of its motion for 
summary judgment, and that document in turn cites an expert 
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report by Nancy Keppelman (an ERISA lawyer) interpreting 
the Plans.  Setting aside the problem of considering expert 
testimony on the interpretation of a pension plan, which is a 
purely legal question and not properly the subject of expert 
testimony, Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 99 
(1st Cir. 1997) (collecting circuit cases); Haberern v. Kaupp 
Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Ben. Plan & Trust 
Agreement, 812 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1992), the 
expert does not even support United’s interpretation of the 
meaning of “retire.”  Keppelman writes, “The cross-reference 
[from § 7.02 to § 5.03] did not confer early retirement 
benefits on [TVP]s.”  Keppelman Report 7, Jan. 24, 2012, 
ECF No. 154-14.  It may be that “the cross reference” does 
not confer early retirement benefits, but § 7.01 explicitly 
does, and § 7.02 clarifies that the amount of the benefits 
conferred by § 7.01 “shall be determined in accordance with” 
§ 5.03 (emphases added).  By drafting an actuarial adjustment 
into the Plan, United is requiring the benefits to be calculated 
not in accordance with § 5.03, the exact opposite of the Plan’s 
requirements. 
2. The External Textual Argument 
The extrinsic documents on which United relies further 
undermine its position.  It posits that § 5.04(c) of the 1995 
and 2002 Plans made explicit what had been true all along: 
TVPs who took their pensions before turning 65 would be 
entitled only to actuarially adjusted pensions.  But even if it 
were permissible to look to the 1995 and 2002 Plans for 
guidance in interpreting the 1980 and 1987 Plans, the addition 
of § 5.04(c) more strongly supports the Employees’ position 
that, without the new language explicitly imposing an 
actuarial adjustment, there was no such adjustment before.   
United also points to certain summary plan 
descriptions (“SPDs”) to argue they clarify that actuarial 
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adjustments are required under the Plans.  The 1987 and 1995 
SPDs (which describe the 1980 and 1987 Plans, respectively) 
state that employees who took vested retirement benefits 
earlier than their normal retirement date would only be 
entitled to actuarially reduced benefits.   
United’s reliance on the SPDs poses two principal 
problems.  First, the SPDs state that “[i]f the terms of the Plan 
document and the Trust agreement and of this summary are 
inconsistent, the terms of the Plan document and the Trust 
agreement will control.”  United Refining Company, Pension 
Plan for Salaried Employees, Summary Plan Description 20 
(Jan. 1 1987); United Refining Company, Pension Plan for 
Salaried Employees, Summary Plan Description 20 (Jan. 1 
1995).  When the SPD contains this sort of a disclaimer and 
the Plan is more favorable to beneficiaries than the SPD, the 
Plan controls.  Sturges v. Hy-Vee Employee Ben. Plan & 
Trust, 991 F.2d 479, 480–81 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); 
Glocker v. W.R. Grace & Co., 974 F.2d 540, 542–43 (4th Cir. 
1992); McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 953 F.2d 
1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 1992).  As discussed, the SPDs conflict 
with the Plans, as the Plans clearly do not contemplate 
actuarial adjustment.   
Second, United published employee handbooks in 
1985, 1991, 1994, and 1998 that are wildly inconsistent on 
whether benefits are calculated with actuarial adjustment, and 
the Employees not implausibly characterize the handbooks as, 
by their own terms, SPDs.  See, e.g., United Refining 
Company, Salaried Employee Handbook 110 (Apr. 1, 1994) 
(“The handbook contains Summary Plan Descriptions of the 
plans . . . .”).  The 1985 handbook (published before 
Amendment 5 to the 1980 Plan removed its actuarial 
adjustment table) stated that pension benefits both for Early 
Retirees (people who retired directly from United after age 
59½ or 60 and before age 65) and TVPs who took benefits 
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before their Normal Retirement Date would be actuarially 
reduced.  The 1991 handbook contained no mention of 
actuarial adjustments for early receipt of benefits.  The 1994 
handbook stated of TVPs, “You can begin receiving benefits 
as early as age 60 with no reduction.”  Id. at 84.  The 1998 
handbook is less quotable, but it includes a sample calculation 
for a person who retires (not necessarily a TVP) at age 59½ 
and does not include an actuarial adjustment for the 
participant’s age.  Indeed, nowhere in the 1998 handbook is 
there any indication that anyone’s benefits might be 
actuarially reduced.  These handbooks’ differences with each 
other and with the SPDs strengthen our conviction that the 
plain meaning of the Plans should control.   
3. The Structural Argument 
United’s structural argument is stronger, but not strong 
enough.  It relies on expert reports from an actuary (Ian 
Altman) and an ERISA lawyer (Keppelman), who point out 
that Article 5 of the Plans addresses benefits for Early 
Retirees—those who retire from United directly before 
turning 65—while Article 7 addresses benefits for TVPs.  If 
the plans intended to treat the two categories of participants 
similarly, why devote a separate section to each group?  The 
question, though provocative, does not overcome the 
indisputable facts that the TVP section explicitly informs 
readers that TVPs’ benefits are to be calculated “in 
accordance with” Article 5 and that nothing in either the 1980 
Plan or the 1987 Plan refers to actuarial adjustments for 
people who elect to receive their pensions early.  The 
structure and language of the plan could be read to suggest 
that without Article 7 TVPs would be entitled to nothing 
more than ERISA’s statutory floor, but with Article 7 they are 
entitled to what Article 7 provides, which is benefits 
calculated in accordance with Article 5. 
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4. The Statutory Argument 
United’s statutory argument fares no better.  ERISA 
§ 206(a) does provide that TVPs are entitled to “no less than” 
an actuarially reduced benefit.  29 U.S.C. § 1056(a).  But for 
the reasons stated above, these Plans expressly provided 
TVPs with more than the statutory floor.  Imposing a 
requirement that a plan be even clearer than the one in this 
litigation would be unreasonable.  The case United relies 
on—McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184 (2d 
Cir. 2007)—only exposes its argument’s weakness.  In 
McCarthy, when a TVP took payment early, the 
benefit was actuarially reduced from the amount 
that would have been paid at age 65 in two 
respects.  First, to reflect the time value of 
money, the Master Retirement Plan reduced the 
benefit by a 6.75 percent discount rate for each 
year prior to the age of 65 that payments began.  
Second, the benefit was reduced by a mortality 
factor to adjust actuarially for the possibility 
that a participant might not live to the age of 65. 
Id. at 189.  These explicit provisions are the opposite of what 
we find in United’s Plans; far from a reference to actuarial 
adjustment or silence that could arguably be understood only 
to provide the minimum pension allowed under ERISA, the 
1980 and 1987 Plans set out a detailed scheme for calculating 
TVPs’ benefits, one that expressly omits any actuarial 
adjustment. 
IV. United Forfeited Any Objection to the District 
Court’s Interest Rate. 
United next argues that, even if we hold that it owes 
the Employees benefits without actuarial adjustment (as we 
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do), the District Court erred in its final order on remedies 
when it ordered United to pay interest at 7.5% on the 
Employees’ damages.  The Court ordered this amount of 
interest based on the 2002 Plan, which set 7.5% as the rate of 
interest for actuarial calculations and on the basis of United’s 
IRS submission, which laid out the company’s plan to recoup 
excess payments to TVPs at 7.5% interest.  Cottillion v. 
United Ref. Co., No. 1:09-cv-140, 2013 WL 5936368, at *9 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2013).  United asserts that because certain 
sections of the Plan that entitle participants to lump sum 
payments state that the interest rate in those contexts is the 
30-year Treasury rate, the interest here should be 3.7%.   
We need not rule on this objection because it is raised 
for the first time in United’s reply brief and hence is waived.  
Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Assocs., 243 F.3d 145, 151 & n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Moreover, although reasonable objections could 
be made to the District Court’s choice of an interest rate, 
United’s proposed rate has no better grounding in the Plan 
documents (the sections that specify the 30-year Treasury rate 
apply only to lump sum payments in the event the Plan is 
terminated or in the case of employees with very small 
pension entitlements).  And because there is some evidence 
that the Plan provided 7.5% as a default rate, the District 
Court’s order was not clearly erroneous. 
V. The Employees Are Not Entitled to More Relief 
Than the District Court Ordered. 
When the District Court entered its final order on 
remedies, it concluded that class members who had not yet 
elected to receive their benefits were entitled only to an 
option to start receiving properly computed benefits at the 
appropriate age under the Plan (or immediately if they were 
older than 59½ or 60, depending on the Plan).  If they were 
older than 59½ or 60, they were not entitled to receive 
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damages in the amount of benefits they would have received 
had they elected to receive (properly computed) benefits as 
early as possible plus interest.  According to the District 
Court, that relief would be “entirely speculative.” Cottillion, 
2013 WL 5936368 at *8.   
The Employees claim that “there is no economic 
incentive for a [TVP] to delay commencing an unreduced 
monthly benefit past his Early Retirement Date.”  Employees’ 
Response and Cross-Appeal at 62.  They are mistaken.  In 
fact, they do not dispute that entitlement to benefits requires 
“actual retirement.”  1980 Plan § 1.31; 1987 Plan § 1.31.  
Because retirement benefits are generally less than salary, 
there is an incentive to keep working and to continue to be 
paid for full-time work instead of electing to receive pension 
benefits conditioned on retirement. 
The Employees advance three other theories to argue 
that that the District Court’s injunction should be modified to 
allow TVPs to receive the payments to which they would 
have been entitled absent the reinterpretation—namely, unjust 
enrichment, surcharge, and restitution.  All of these rationales 
suffer from the same flaw: the Employees failed to prove in 
the District Court that class members would have taken 
unreduced pension benefits early. 
The Employees do not seek remand to prove on an 
individual basis that those eligible for unreduced early 
retirement benefits who have not yet elected to take them (or 
who only took them after turning 65) would have taken them 
earlier but for United’s new interpretation of the Plan.  In a 
footnote, the Employees suggest that “the court could order 
retroactive benefits using a utilization factor based on an 
assumption that individual class members would have 
delayed commencing an unreduced benefit by the average of 
such delays prior to the cutback, as proposed by [their] 
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expert.”  Employees’ Response Br. and Cross-Appeal at 65 
n.20.  However this suggestion would play out, the injured 
class members suffered individualized damages, and this sort 
of aggregate proceeding violates the ordinary rule that “a 
class action cannot be certified in a way that . . . masks 
individual issues.”  Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 
307 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (rejecting as “abridging a 
substantive right” the extrapolation of class-based damages 
from a sample of the class). 
The Employees’ final argument readily fails.  They 
contend that the District Court should not have dismissed the 
remaining counts of their complaint as duplicative of the anti-
cutback claim because it failed to award them full relief on 
the anti-cutback count.  In other words, they claim that the 
order granting judgment on the pleadings to United should be 
reversed for the same reasons that they contend the damages 
awarded were inadequate.  But because the Employees have 
received the full remedy to which they are entitled, anything 
more would indeed be duplicative.  Thus, the District Court’s 
decision was proper. 
VI. United’s Pending Motions 
 There remain two motions pending: United’s Motion 
for Stay of District Court Judgment and its Motion to Strike 
Part H of the Employees’ Brief.  The Motion to Stay is denied 
as moot in light of our disposition of the appeal. 
Part H of the Employees’ Fourth Step Brief responds 
to arguments that, they say, were improperly raised in 
United’s Second Step Brief.  United is correct that the 
Employees should not have responded to these arguments by 
way of a reply brief, but should have either moved for leave 
to file a sur-reply or moved to strike United’s arguments.  See 
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Fed. R. App. P. 28.1(c)(4); USX Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 444 F.3d 192, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Motion is 
granted insofar as it attacks all but the last paragraph of Part 
H, which responds to a letter by United informing us of a 
non-precedential opinion that the Employees (rightly) argue is 
irrelevant (like all the other cases brought to our attention by 
United’s six 28(j) letters).  For these reasons, all but the last 
paragraph of Part H is stricken as an impermissible sur-reply 
filed without leave. 
* * * * * 
 United provided detailed pension plans that clearly 
explained how to calculate payments owed to those who, like 
the Employees here, earned accrued benefits and left United 
before they were eligible to receive them.  The Plans’ method 
of calculation did not include an actuarial adjustment for 
participants who took benefits before turning 65, and ERISA 
forbids United from drafting those reductions into the Plans 
whether by amendment, “interpretation,” or otherwise.  
United must pay the Employees what it promised, and thus 
the careful and thorough judgments of the District Court are 
affirmed. 
